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Abstract: The Russian Federation developed very different ideologies on the 
concept of democracy. In 2006, Vladislav Surkov, the First Deputy of the Chief of the 
Russian Presidential Administration, coined the term “sovereign democracy”. This gave a 
name to the Russian form of “managed” democracy and introduced a Russian alternative 
to Western liberal democracy: Sovereign Democracy. It asserts that Russia is a 
democracy and this fact must never be questioned by any state or such action will be 
viewed by the Kremlin as unwanted intervention in its domestic affairs.  The Kremlin 
reacted to the recent Color Revolutions in the former Soviet Bloc by defining the concept 
of sovereign democracy. Russian democratic ideology, depicted within sovereign 
democracy, states both sovereignty and democracy are socially and culturally determined.  
The Kremlin argues Western interference, such as supporting the Color Revolutions, 
imposed Western conceptions of democracy on Russian civilians, and this interference is 
an attempt to influence Russia’s political philosophies and institutions. Putin and his 
administration emphasized the demarcation between Russian sovereign democracy and 
Western liberal democracy. Sovereign democracy allows the Kremlin to validate their 
increasingly undemocratic domestic and international policies. In particular, it led to the 
creation of the domestic agency, Russian Federal Public Chamber, in 2006 and heavily 
influenced the Kremlin’s decision to assist Belarusian President Alexsandr Lukashenko 
after the presidential elections in 2006. When the Kremlin proclaimed sovereign 
democracy as the uniquely Russian form of democracy, it crafted itself a defense against 
international criticism; because, to question sovereign democracy, and the policies it led 





The outbreak of Color Revolutions across former Soviet republics: Georgia (Rose 
Revolution 2003), Ukraine (Orange Revolution 2004), and Kyrgyzstan (Tulip Revolution 
2005) deeply disturbed the Putin administration. The term “Color Revolutions” was 
widely used by international media to depict various associated movements that 
developed in several Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) nations and the 
Balkans throughout the early 2000s.1 The movements take their name from the fact that 
they adopted a certain color or flower as their symbol. 2  Color Revolutions were 
considered unique; people took to the streets and through nonviolent protests (also called 
civil resistance) demanded free and fair elections, which resulted in new democratic 
governments. These former Soviet states rebelled against their despotic governments that 
had been heavily swayed by the Russian state, generating a strong pressure for regional 
democratic change. The Putin administration felt deeply threatened by this outcome.  
Officially, Russia still functions under democratic institutions, such as 
constitutionally insured liberties and freedoms, elections, independent courts and media. 
In actuality, democratic practices have eroded and been replaced with increasingly more  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is a regional organization that developed when 
the Soviet Union began to collapse. Its members are a loose association of former Soviet 
Republics. The organization is headed by Russia, and at times has been referred to as the 
“Russian Commonwealth.” 	  	  
2	  The Rose Revolution gained its name from the action of demonstrators in its main square. When 
soldiers and local police arrived to enforce order, the student protestors often were seen giving 
them red roses. Orange Revolution’s name derived from the color identified with the campaign of 
the opposition candidate the protesters rallied around, Viktor Yushchenko. Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip 
Revolution had been called many things by the media: the “Pink,” “Silk,” “Lemon,” or 
“Daffodil,” Revolution. However, it was a term used by protested President Askar Akayev in a 
speech declaring- no Color, or Tulip, Revolution would happen in Kyrgyzstan.  
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authoritarian methods.3 Freedom House’s 2014 annual report listed Russia’s status as 
“Not Free,” with a Freedom Rating of 5.5 (range 1 to 7 with 1=best, 7=worst).4 The Putin 
administration claimed these authoritarian policy changes as necessity in order to institute 
a “sovereign democracy.” In 2006, Vladislav Surkov, the First Deputy of the Chief of the 
Russian Presidential Administration, coined the term sovereign democracy and gave a 
name to the Russian form of “managed” democracy, which asserts that Russia is a 
democracy and this fact must never be questioned by any state or such action will be 
viewed by the Kremlin as unwanted intervention in its domestic affairs.  Soon after 
sovereign democracy’s creation by Surkov it became the official doctrine of Putin and his 
administration. The introduction of sovereign democracy was the Russian reaction to the 
recent Color Revolutions, and an attempt to reassert its status as a great power in the 
twenty-first century.  
Russian democratic ideology, depicted within sovereign democracy, states both 
sovereignty and democracy are socially and culturally determined.  The Russian 
government argues Western interference, such as supporting the Color Revolutions, 
imposes Western conceptions of democracy on Russian civilians, and this interference is 
an attempt to influence Russia’s political philosophies and institutions. The Western 
response is to accuse the Russian state of undermining and corrupting genuine democratic 
change in the post-Soviet region. My thesis focuses on the following questions:  How did  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Michael A. McFaul and Kathryn Stoner. “The Myth of the Authoritarian Model: How Putin's 
Crackdown Holds Russia Back,” Originally appeared in Foreign Affairs January 1, 2008. 
Stanford University, September 28, 2008.	  
4	  "Freedom In the World 2014: Russia," Freedom House.	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the Color Revolutions in former Soviet republics, and its feared domino effect, impact the 
development of sovereign democracy? Moreover, how has it influenced domestic and 
international policy decisions?  
Grounded in democratization literature, this essay investigates how the Color 
Revolutions led to an increase in unapologetic, anti-democratic domestic and foreign 
policies by the Russian Federation, and a uniquely Russian concept of democracy. When 
the Kremlin proclaimed sovereign democracy as the uniquely Russian form of 
democracy, it crafted a defense against international criticism; because, to question 
sovereign democracy, and the policies it spawned, would be tantamount to criticizing 
Russian social and cultural history. The policy justification sovereign democracy 
permitted was not limited the period after the Color Revolutions. This study has 
relevance to what is going on now in Russian-Ukrainian relations, however it is beyond 
the capacity of this study offer an in-depth investigate of this ongoing event.  
The primarily focus of this study is the domestic and international policy 
decisions made by the Russian Federation closely following the Color Revolutions. 
Official Kremlin documents and statements made by key Russia policy-makers show a 
clear reaction to the Color Revolutions. I pay special attention to the statements made in 
the years 2004-2006, especially relating to the creation of the Public Chamber of the 
Russian Federation and 2006 presidential election in Belarus.5 The first point examines 
democratization in Russia and the specific ways Color Revolutions, and the evolving 
theoretical construct of sovereign democracy, has affected Russian domestic and foreign  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  The majority of sources used have been professionally translated into English.	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policy. The second point then turns to the Kremlin’s new domestic vision of state and 
society detailed in the philosophy of sovereign democracy. This is done through an in-
depth case study of the newly created Russian Public Chamber (2006.) Finally, the third 
point discusses how the revolutions have influenced Russian foreign policy decisions in 
relation to Belarus, using a case study of the Russian reaction to the 2006 presidential 
elections in Belarus. The Russian leadership feared more former Soviet States would 
experience a Color Revolution, especially Belarus. I look at the assistance the Kremlin 
gave Belarusian President Alexsandr Lukashenko’s regime after highly criticized 2006 
presidential elections. These exemplify the undemocratic authoritarian policies enacted 
within Russia’s domestic and international sphere in the period immediately after the 
Color Revolutions.  
 
The Color Revolutions and Concretization of Sovereign Democracy  
 
Democracy Promotion in Russia Before the Color Revolutions I begin the discussion of 
my first point by giving a brief summary of democracy in the newly created Russian 
Federation. Western style NGOs appeared in the Soviet Union during the last few years 
of the Gorbachev period. Democracy promotion began in the early 1990s when foreign 
NGOs were officially legalized by the Russian Federation, after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union.  American, along with European intergovernmental organizations and 
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs) aspired to develop the new Russian state into a 
stable democratic state, with respect for human rights and international laws.  An  
Fisher 6 
effective, stable democracy is defined as four key mechanisms: an open and accountable 
government, free and fair elections, significant civil and political rights, and a 
democratic society. 6  This definition does not entail an economic component (e.g. 
liberalism) instead focusing heavily on the idea of free, fair elections and a functional 
civil society.  
Democracy promoters were hopeful after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1991. Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika had led to an increase in liberalization and civil 
activism, and the seemingly more democratic and liberal Boris Yeltsin had replaced 
Gorbachev.  Russia aspired to be acknowledged by the West and to be judged by Western 
standards, and the new leaders attempted to remove the conventional Russian 
exceptionalism and have Russia accepted as a true European country.7  President Yeltsin 
desired complete integration of Russia into Western institutions to achieve this objective, 
however, the new Russian state lacked stability, and both communists and nationalists 
endangered the new leadership. Russian instability caused Yeltsin to ignore the 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6David Beetham and Kevin Boyle. Introducing Democracy: Eighty Questions and Answers, 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995. 31. 
 
7 The idea of Russian exceptionalism began in early tsarist Russia, and was the belief that the 
state was a vessel of Orthodoxy, its mission the expansion and defense of the faith, and the Third 
Rome.  After the 1917 Revolution, the Bolsheviks altered Russian exceptionalism to fit Marxist 
goals instead of the Orthodoxy.   Russian exceptionalism now centered on the idea that the state’s 
destiny was to be an ideological inspiration to the world, and the communist system produced the 
world’s most sophisticated industrial and scientific achievements.   
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charge in shaping the source of independent nongovernmental organizations.8 Western 
governments and intergovernmental organizations sought to actively express their 
support, politically and financially, for President Yeltsin since he had come to represent 
the liberal, democratic forces in Russia.9 
Leading the first wave of Western NGOs were pro-democracy foundations 
financed by George Soros and the MacArthur Foundation, which had initiated contact in 
the twilight of the Gorbachev years. The largest hurdle for these NGOs was to bolster an 
underdeveloped civil society and remove the deeply entrenched passive political culture, 
all during a time of extreme economic instability.10 The Russian general population faced 
many struggles during the early 1990s: economic instability, a tenuous political and civil 
society, and a constant political struggle for leadership between the president and the 
parliament.  
The power struggle came to fruition in September of 1993 when President Yeltsin 
suspended the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People’s Deputies, first by decree and 
later by force.11 Yeltsin stated in a 1993 official presidential decree this “situation that 
has come about as a result of reciprocal accusations of corruption and legal claims against 
one another by officials in the system of executive power is seriously undermining the 
state authority of the Russian Federation,” and called for new elections and a referendum  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Henderson, Sarah L. “Civil Society in Russia: State-Society Relations in the Post-Yeltin Era,” 
12.	  
9Saari, Sinikukka. “European democracy promotion in Russia before and after the 'colour' 
revolutions,” 734-736. 
10, Marc Morje Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society, 17 – 18. 
11Eugene Huskey. “Democracy and Institutional Design in Russia,” George Washington 
University Archive, Stetson University, (1996): 460.  
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on the new constitution.12 The supporters of the Congress of Deputies began a violent riot 
in Moscow to protest Yeltsin actions. Yeltsin retaliated by shelling the Russian White 
House with tanks, which ultimately resolved the conflict but led to an estimated 200 
casualties. The majority of Western organizations chose to ignore Yeltsin’s 
unconstitutional actions, and those that claimed he acted undemocratically and suggested 
the new elections were rigged were largely overlooked. Societal stability, which appeared 
to be arising in Russia, was given preference over strict regard for democratic practices.  
This began a trend of disregarding Russian undemocratic practices in attempts to further 
the larger goal of democracy, which allowed undemocratic practices to become the norm 
in Russia.  
The mid to late 1990s saw a shift in attitude from the West towards Russia. In 
1995 many NGO’s reported significant worsening of democracy and human rights, and 
demanded more condemnation from governmental actors. The vast human rights 
violations enacted in the first Russian war with the Chechen Republic could not be 
overlooked, however the intergovernmental organizations did attempt to balance their 
criticism with the usual support towards the Russian government. As the First Chechen 
War continued the European regional organizations employed harsher methods in relation 
to Russia, such as the EU delaying the ratification of the Interim Agreement on Trade.13  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Boris Yeltsin. "Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1328." The Current 
Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, (September 1993): 1. 
 
13 The Interim Agreement on Trade suspension only lasted from lasted from January to July 1995, 
and was signed on July 17, 1995 in Brussels. (European Commission, Press Release: Interim 
Agreement with Russia, July 17, 1996, PRES/95/224.) This is evidence of the success of the 
Russian tactic; the war with Chechnya was still underway.    
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The efforts made by intergovernmental actors did not satisfy most NGOs. The 1996 
Human Rights Watch’s World Report classified the European Union’s involvement in the 
Chechen War as “waning prematurely,” and criticized the Clinton administration as 
responding “sluggishly” and “belittling it as an internal matter.”14 Saari states the Russian 
reaction to these criticisms was to assert that European censure endangered the new 
constitutional order and strengthened anti-democratic opposition in Russia. This tactic, to 
combat Western criticism, has been utilized many times by Russian leaders with a high 
rate of effectiveness.15 
The over the next few years the Russian political elite increased their 
manipulation of the political processes, which others viewed as the unwritten rules of 
Russian politics and elections, and were in essence undemocratic. NGOs operating in 
Russia reported such practices as manipulation of the media and outright election fraud, 
and once again demanded governmental action. 16  Nevertheless, European 
intergovernmental organizations acknowledged the recent Russian 1996 elections as free 
and fair, upholding the results. The failure of intergovernmental organizations to disclose 
the surge of anti-democratic practices in the Yeltsin regime weakened the democratic 
values the organization promoted. It also reinforced many past communist practices, such 
as solidifying the interdependence between the Russian political system and economics,  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 “1996 World Report,” Human Rights Watch. 
15 Sinikukka Saari. "European democracy promotion in Russia before and after the 
'colour' revolutions." Democratization 16, no. 4 (2009): 737. 
16	  Michael McFaul. Russia’s 1996 Presidential Election: The End of Polarized Politics, Stanford: 
Hoover Institution Press, 1997, 14.	  
Fisher 10 
and promoted the creation of “fictions” to gratify authorities.17 As Saari notes: “The 
Western policy of explaining ‘irregularities’ away indirectly legitimized Russian 
undemocratic practices.”18 
In the 1990s the states located furthest away from Western Europe, primarily 
Central Asia, saw a rise in draconian policies and dictatorship. Russia, like most of the 
states located in Eastern Europe, transformed into semi-autocracies and partial 
democracies.19 The Russia Federation has moved past the chaos of the 1990s, deemed the 
Yeltsin years, and into the Putin era. By the late 1990s democratic change in the region 
seemed extremely doubtful.20 Putin has amalgamated semi-authoritarian institutions in 
Russia. The Putin had already begun enacting more authoritarian policies, inspired by the 
terrorist acts of 1999 and the Second Chechen War, within the first three year of his 
presidency. Putin cemented his control over the national media and crafted a system of 
“vertical power” with him at the head. This increase in semi-authoritarian domestic 
policies did not extend to directly condemning international democracy promotion, and 
he remained relatively pro-Western in his public statements. However, these authoritarian 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Janine R. Wedel. Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern 
Europe 1989–1998, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 188-190.  
18 Sinikukka Saari. “European democracy promotion in Russia before and after the 'colour' 
revolutions,” 738. 
19	  Michael McFaul. “Transitions from Postcommunism,” Democracy 16, no 3. (July 2005): 5-6.	  	  
20	  Michael McFaul. “Transitions from Postcommunism,” 6. 
Fisher 11 
After the Color Revolutions: Regulation of Civil Society: The Color Revolutions began 
in 2003 with the Georgian Rose Revolution, which was quickly followed by the 
Ukrainian Orange Revolution in 2004, and Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution in 2005 (see 
Figure 1.) From an outside perspective the revolutions appear closely linked; some even 
consider the Orange Revolution as a by-product of the Rose Revolution. Georgian 
activist and organizers traveled to Ukraine and assisted pro-democracy activists with their 
local movement. Success in a near-by state inspired others to rebel against their own 












	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Thomas Ambrosio. “Insulating Russia from a Colour Revolution: How the Kremlin Resists 
Regional Democratic Trends,” Democratization 14, no. 2 (2007): 232. 
Kyrgyzstan,	  2005	  








Diffusion is the process in which one state undergoes democratic change, which 
intensifies pressure on other authoritarian regimes in close proximity. Democratic 
revolutions ultimately are established upon local dynamics; however, geographic 
propinquity notably increases the probability of democratic change. Once the people of a 
non-democratic state observe their neighbors employing democratic demonstration 
efforts regime change is now seen as plausible. Furthermore, the population begins to 
consider regime change as inevitable; this emboldens citizens and the movement gains 
momentum.  This consideration also poses a threat to authoritarian regimes in which the 
populations do not become politically active (as was the case in Russia.) The new 
democratic border states are a continual reminder of the prospect of regime change. 
Moreover, as the amount of states in the region become more democratic, the 
discrepancies between regime types appear blatant, which can lead to increased 
international pressure and external criticism. Once democratic states become effectual 
internally, they are inclined to export their ideas and tactics to local like-minded groups 
in authoritarian states (through organizations such as NGOs), with the assistance of 
established democracies (e.g. the United States). 22  Authoritarian regimes view the 
abovementioned trait of diffusion as an extreme threat to their national security. 
 Thomas Ambrosio proposes three strategies the Kremlin implemented to avoid 
the regional democratic trends brought about by the Color Revolutions. These 
international strategies are defined as: insulate, bolster and subvert. The Kremlin 
attempted to insulate itself from democracy by employing “authoritarian resistance,” seen  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Thomas Ambrosio.  “Insulating Russia from a Color Revolution: How the Kremlin Resists 
Regional Democratic Trends,” 234-236.	  
Fisher 13 
in the changing policies discussed below (4-pronged strategy and the Public Chamber.)   
The second tactic, bolster, is exemplified in the Russian support for authoritarianism in 
Belarus. 23  This essay is limited in scope, therefore, will not present an in-depth look at 
the final tactic, subvert, which describes the Russian rhetorical and foreign policy 
aggression against Ukraine.  
It had been recognized that the West used various means to expand its influence 
(through democracy promotion) since the disintegration of the Soviet Union; however, 
the Color Revolutions saw a deployment of new methods more ominous than traditional 
military intimidation.24 The Kremlin perceived these events as proof Western actors, 
especially the United States, intended to instigate regime change in the post-Soviet space 
through external and internal infiltration tactics.  There have been many common factors 
recognized by the Russian and Western scholarly community that explain the reason the 
color revolutions transpired.  Kuzio’s framework lists these factors: 
• A semi-authoritarian state allowing for the existence of democratic opposition, 
• A ‘return to Europe’ civic nationalism- rallying civil society,  
• A pro- democratic capital city,  
• A preceding political crisis, charismatic opposition candidate,  
• A highly unpopular ruling class,  
• Cohesive opposition,  
• Mobilized youth, 
• Decentralization along with foreign intervention.25 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Thomas Ambrosio.  “Insulating Russia from a Color Revolution: How the Kremlin Resists 
Regional Democratic Trends,” 234.	  
24 Gleb Pavovskii, quoted in, “Is the Cold War Being Repeated?” Renminribao, May 16, 2006, 
via World News Connection. 
25 Taras Kuzio, ‘Democratic Breakthroughs and Revolutions in Five Postcommunist 
Countries, 2008, 97-99. 
Fisher 14 
The Color Revolutions served as the framework to the evolving discussion over the new 
Russian model of democracy. Moreover, the Russian elite recognized the common 
factors and began to arrange their domestic and international policies to counter the 
internal and external threat of Color Revolutions.   
Russia chose not to act as a passive target in the face of perceived Color 
Revolutions domino effect. The Kremlin, under Putin, increased its efforts of 
‘authoritarian resistance’ to restore centralized control over state and society. Policies 
were implemented to counter the process of diffusion, insulating Russia and preserving 
authoritarianism.26   Jeanne L. Wilson detailed the Kremlin’s response as a “four-
pronged” strategy: (1) regulate NGOs, (2) channel the political activism of the youth, (3) 
directly manage elections, and (4) rigorously restrict foreign election monitors.27 
 
(1) Regulating NGOs: The Putin administration alleged foreign backed NGOs had 
played a large role in the Color Revolutions and feared these NGOs would weaken his 
government’s authority.  In his 2004 State of the Nation Address Putin expressed his 
anxiety that NGOs had been used by Western governments to incite regime change. He 
stated the primary goal of NGOs had become “receiving financing from influential 
foreign foundations” rather than  “standing up for people’s real interests.”28 In 2006, 
Putin signed the NGO Law, which placed the organizations under intense government  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Thomas Ambrosio.  “Insulating Russia from a Color Revolution: Regional Democratic 
Trends,” 236.	  
27 Jeanne L. Wilson. "The Legacy of the Color Revolutions for Russian Politics and Foreign 
Policy." Problems Of Post-Communism 57, no. 2 (2010): 21-23.  
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  Vladimir Putin. “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation” 
(Moscow) May 24, 2006.  
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scrutiny and would later (after a 2007 modification) forbid any governmental figure form 
associating with foreign, or foreign backed, NGOs.29   
 
(2) Pro-Kremlin Youth Movements: All of the Color Revolutions saw a mass 
mobilization of that country’s youth. The youth movement in Ukraine, called Pora, 
modeled itself after the movements in Georgia. The Putin administration concocted a 
counter-response, which was designed to gain the support of the Russian youth. Pro-
Kremlin youth organization, such as Nashi (Ours), emerged and endorsed patriotism, 
civil responsibility and the defense of Russian sovereignty.30  Nashi’s main task, as the 
largest of the recently created youth organization, was to eliminate any trace of a 
potential Russia Color Revolution within the Russian youth.  
 
(3) Directly Managed Elections: Color Revolutions typically arose from a contested 
election; the Kremlin was acutely mindful of this fact. This had occurred in Georgia, 
Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan and caused the Kremlin to initiate an extensive effort to manage 
future election results.31  Putin even attempted to demonize the Color Revolutions, and 
the opposition leaders it benefited, as minions of Western governments. The November 
21st, 2007, speech by Putin described these potential opposition leaders as people “who 
act like jackals at foreign embassies . . . who count on the support of foreign funds and 
governments but not the support of their own people. . . . They’ve learnt from Western  
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specialists. They’ve trained in neighboring republics.”32 Many viewed these blatantly 
managed elections as unnecessary, considering the support for Putin’s party United 
Russia. Nevertheless, the Putin administration today continues the practice out of fear.  
 
(4) Restricting Foreign Election Monitors: The West uses various means to insure fair, 
free and transparent elections, one of which is election monitoring. The principal 
organization that does this in former Soviet states is the Office for Democratic and 
Human Rights (ODHIR), the election-monitoring branch of the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).33 Many in Russia criticized the purpose of election 
monitoring; stating it is not to insure fair free election but as a means of political 
pressure. After the Color Revolutions, and the increase of election managing described 
above, the Kremlin did not wish to allow the West anymore reason to become involved in 
their affairs. In 2004, Sergei Lavrov Russia’s foreign minister claimed, “Election 
monitoring is not only ceasing to make sense, but is also becoming an instrument of 
political manipulation and a destabilizing factor.”34 The relationship between the OSCE 
and the Kremlin has only weakened since 2004. For example, the 2007-2008 elections 
saw a heightening of tension between the Kremlin and OSCE. The OSCE declined to 
send any monitors to oversee the December 2007 legislative elections; stating 
unreasonable and severe restrictions imposed by the Russian government. In addition to  
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imposing various constrictions on their mobility, Russia reduced the number of monitors 
invited to seventy in 2007; a stark difference from the 450 invited in 2003. An OSCE 
representative reported, “despite repeated attempts to attain entry visas into the Russian 
Federation for ODIHR experts and observers, entry visas have continuously been 
denied.” 35 The situation did not find a resolution and Russia continues to review the rules 
of electoral monitoring.  
The Russian approach to democracy and state sovereignty has been heavily 
influenced by the Color Revolutions, and there is a close link between Putin’s domestic 
recentralization project, and his efforts to reassert Russia’s position internationally. The 
first point of this essay examines democratization in Russia and the specific ways Color 
Revolutions, and the evolving theoretical construct of sovereign democracy, have 
affected Russian domestic and foreign policy 
 
The Evolving Theoretical Construct of Sovereign Democracy. The basic definition of 
sovereignty is the application of supreme authority over a defined geographical 
territory.36 The constructionist view of sovereignty asserts that states uphold certain 
central units of analysis, yet the sovereignty is socially and culturally constructed; 
therefore subject to change vis-à-vis each state’s interpretations. Authority, national 
identity, population and territory are major aspects of sovereignty and are socially 
constructed; which are contingent on the specific society. After the collapse of the Soviet  
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Union new norms of sovereignty began to emerge, particularly in regards to intervening 
into states’ internal affairs.37  
 Russia’s concept of sovereignty has evolved since the Color Revolutions began in 
the early 2000s, an evolution they have shared with the world through domestic and 
international policy modifications.   In the 1990s Russian policies frequently contained 
undemocratic undertones, but they were hidden under pro-Western democratic rhetoric. 
Once the Color Revolutions occurred this veil of pro-Western sentiments has been almost 
completely removed from the Russian dialogue, and a more straightforward challenge to 
international democracy promotion taken. In 2006 Vladislav Surkov, then the First 
Deputy of the Chief of the Russian Presidential Administration, expanded the debate on 
democratization when he developed a term for the Russian alternative to Western liberal 
democracy: Sovereign Democracy.  
Sovereign democracy can be simplified into two basic features: (1) Russian 
democratic development does not conform to Western standards, and (2) sovereignty 
always takes precedence over democracy.38  Surkov professes that Russian society, and 
therefore Russian sovereignty, is distinct and cannot be expected to conform to Western 
norms and models. He elaborates in his 2008 article “Russian Political Culture: The View 
from Utopia.”  Surkov expresses his dismay that the Russian people often call their 
country “the new Russia,” as if it were the New World, or “new home.”39  Like the  
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country, Russian sovereign democracy has been constructed on the historical foundation 
of national statehood. Its political culture and norms are rooted in European civilization, 
except in a specific Russian variety of that civilization.  Russian political culture is 
holistic, instinctively centralized and there is a geopolitical subtext.40  
Authoritarianism and centralization were necessary to maintain Russian 
sovereignty according to Surkov, “The consolidation and centration of power were 
necessary to preserve the sovereign state and turn it around, away from oligarchy and 
towards democracy.” 41   For Surkov, and many other Russian leaders, democracy 
(personal freedom) is interlocked with sovereignty (national freedom), meaning state 
sovereignty is of paramount importance surpassing popular sovereignty. If not bolstered 
by a strong executive and institutions, Russia would fragment and descend into 
pandemonium, undermining the state’s sovereignty. Russia faces real threats to its 
sovereignty, and as long as it remains rich in natural resources and in possession of 
nuclear weapons, outsiders will continue to attempt to invade and influence the state.42  
Russia’s appraisal of the Color Revolutions reflected this trepidation of outside 
interference in its affairs and the affairs of the states in its sphere of influence.  
As mentioned previously democracy is secondary to sovereignty, however the 
concept of “democracy” has not disappeared from the official Russian political discourse. 
Over the last decades the achievement of democracy has been correlated to 
modernization, a symbol of national progress. Western governments, especially the  
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United States, inserted this theory into the wider political discourse to increase the 
likelihood of democratic transitions. Currently, democracy remains a significant topic in 
Russian political discourse, associated with modernization, regardless there have been 
many measures taken to restrict it in political practice.  This is primarily because 
sovereign democracy identifies the international world in terms of the standard realist 
interpretation of world affairs: as an essentially lawless dangerous place structured 
around brutal competition, and democratic practices must be suspended to preserve the 
sovereign state.43  Valerii Zorkin, the current Chairman of the Constitutional Court of the 
Russian Federation, claimed: “In this sense, we really found ourselves in a chaotic world 
in which everything has become unpredictable. In this anomic global chaos there is only 
one law—the law of the strong and aggressive: the superpowers, dictators, and leaders of 
mafia-like and terrorist groups”44 The sovereign democracy discourse among elites 
underlines the importance of Russia independence, and the international law of 
noninterference.  
Sovereign democracy also stresses the importance of Russian sovereign and 
democratic externally and internally. Surkov writes internal sovereign democracy is  “a 
type of political life for the society in which the state, its organs and activities are chosen, 
formed and directed exclusively by the Russian nation with all its many forms and 
unities, in order to achieve the material well-being, freedom and justice for all citizens, 
social groups and peoples who form that nation.”45 He also asserts the importance of the  
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population to sovereignty; Russian popular sovereignty differs drastically from the liberal 
definition of the term. Sovereign democracy designates the population as a collective 
entity, which embodies the whole nation, and rather than following their own individual 
goals the Russian citizen must “bow to the will of the nation.”46 Western liberal 
democracy is quite different, it entails citizens must pursue their own private interests to 
contribute the good of the nation. Surkov maintains the Russian population can only 
obtain true freedom when, “the nation of which he is a part if also free in a justly 
structured world.”47 Sovereign democracy is a democracy that values collective initiative 
in a nationalist display rather than individual freedoms. In essence, the collective will of 
the population is achieved through the state, however sovereign democracy does not offer 
an explanation of what determines the collective will.  
 The majority of Russian elites maintain that the civil society lacks the 
organization and trust to effectively carry out the collective will. Therefore, government’s 
role is not to decide what the collective will of society is, but instead to determine what it 
is and imposes it. A charge, which according to Surkov, must be accomplished by a 
formable personality, “strong personalities often compensate for the collective’s 
ineffectiveness, the lack of mutual trust and self-organization.”48 Since this single strong 
personality does not design the collective will, elites assist by acting as functional agents 
of civil society.   Political analyst Vlad Ivanenko perceived sovereign democracy as  
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assuming society contains two groups: elites and ordinary citizens. Elites must keep the 
state together and uphold internal unity when exposed by internal and external threats. 
Their vital task allows them to control the majority of the national wealth and rule 
unopposed.49  The philosophy of sovereign democracy serves as a consolidating doctrine 
for the governing elites and creates an elite confederation, which assurances democratic 
progress in Russia.50  After the Color Revolutions President Vladimir Putin saw an 
express need for this type of elite confederation. His solution was to create the 
nongovernmental organization the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation.  
  
 
The Federal Public Chamber 
 
  
Integrating State and Society: As discussed previously, reasserting the power of the 
Russian state, internally and externally, has been a central goal of the Putin 
administration, and one way to achieve this has been to institutionalize relations between 
the state and civil society. The doctrine of sovereign democracy has served as a model for 
the Kremlin’s efforts to control civil society. Civil society is the vehicle in which the 
ranges of citizen’s initiatives are explored, and is fairly independent from state  
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mechanisms.51 In essence, it is the relationship between state and society, as well as 
society’s engagement as an active participation in public interests. President Vladimir 
Putin’s administration effectively removed the term “civil society” from the vocabulary 
of democratic reformist, who condemned Putin’s authoritarian policies, by twisting the 
rhetoric of civil society to their own purposes. The Russian version of civil society 
stressed the significance of the collective interest of the nation, and the expectation that 
citizens must subordinate their private interests to further state interests. This very narrow 
view of the public realm caused any deviation from these boundaries to be labeled non-
credible extremism.52  
 Putin defined civil society not as a chaotic arena where private and public 
interests competed equally, but rather as a unified body working towards state interests.53 
If these two groups do not efficiently work together the Kremlin believed the sovereignty 
of the state would be threatened. From 2003 to 2004, three events transpired that deeply 
alarmed the Kremlin, and made the campaign to command civil society an extreme 
priority. First, the crisis in Beslan, which shocked the nation, emphasized popular apathy 
and corruption had made the state more susceptible to terrorism. 54  Second, and most 
significant, the Color Revolutions, especially the Orange Revolution in Ukraine,  
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amplified suspicions of foreign organizations working in Russia. Third, mass protests 
began in Russia, which objected to the monetization of social benefits, served to reinforce 
anxieties raised by the recent revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine.55  The protests 
confirmed the Kremlin’s worse fear; the potential for political unrest in Russia.  In 
reference to a Color Revolution Surkov stated, “I am not able to say that this issue is no 
longer on the agenda, because if they can achieve this in four states, why not do it in a 
fifth?”56 
Putin presented numerous speeches that contain many references to constructing a 
sturdy civil society, and the necessity of integrating civil society into the power sphere of 
the executive branch. This goal became a reality in 2004 when he began formulating the 
structure of civil society he deemed appropriate for Russia. In this section I examine 
Vladimir Putin’s creation of the Federal Public Chamber in order to institutionalize 
Russian civil society, which was purposed with delivering feedback to the state.57  
Creating “social chambers,” usually staffed by NGO representatives that counseled and 
consulted government agencies, became a common tactic used by the Kremlin to 
strengthen the sovereign state. The Public Chamber stood at the head of this initiative.   
 On September 13, 2004, twelve days after the Beslan school hostage crisis, Putin 
emphasized the need for political unity, cementing the executive authority’s chain of 
command, and proposed the creation of the Public Chamber. The new chamber would  
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symbolize a promise to give civil society more input in policy-making and serve as a  
“platform for extensive dialogue, where citizens’ initiatives could be presented and 
discussed in detail.” This executive unity would allow the two groups to “work as a 
single integrated organism with a clear structure of subordination,” and this new chamber 
“essentially means civilian control of the work of the state system.”58 Putin formally 
submitted the Public Chamber bill in December 2004, and it received final approval by 
the Duma and Federal Assembly in March 2005. Putin himself signed the bill into law 
one month later; the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation (Общественная палата 
Российской Федерации) became operational January 2006.59   
 The new Public Chamber consisted of 126 prominent members of civil society, 
who were selected under careful consideration; Putin either directly or indirectly selected 
all of the members. For example, the official Russian Public Chamber website describes 
the organization’s formation in three stages, in accordance with Russian federal law. The 
first forty-two members Putin appointed himself, and these were “Russian citizens who 
had performed special services to the state and society.”60 These first forty-two members 
selected the next forty-two from popular Russian NGOs. The previously chosen eighty-
four members selected the final forty-two from a pool of candidates that had advanced 
from regional and federal districts.   
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The Kremlin’s vision of who may be a legitimate participant of civil society 
played a large part in the selection of the members of the Public Chamber. All of the 
members were successful and admired individuals, bringing prestige and credibility to the 
new chamber.61  President Putin stated in 2005 that the members should be “citizens who 
have broad public support, personal authority, and influence in society and their 
professional milieu.”62 The majority of members of the first term Public Chamber were 
from organizations supportive and with close ties to the Kremlin. They consisted of: 
 The Public Chamber stands at the center of organized civil society. It serves as a 
model for the various other regional public chambers and councils, and its members, as 
mentioned previously, are some of the most influential individuals of civil society. 64 It 
outlines the federal government approved version of how state and society should 
interact. The Public Chamber in a detailed example of the boundaries between the 
Russian state and society, as depicted in the doctrine of sovereign democracy. James  
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• 22 academics  
• 16 political scientists or economic 
analysts 
• 15 work in the arts and culture 
• 14 lawyers  
• 12 journalists or literary figures 
 
• 8 religious leaders  
• 7 entrepreneurs  
• 5 doctors 
• 4 education experts 
• 23 have other occupations 63 
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Richter describes this as; “The very notion that this creature of the state [Public Chamber] 
should represent society reflects the belief that the state serves as the embodiment of a 
collective will separate from and higher than the particular interest of society itself,” and 
it is a “more or less unified coalition of social notables” whose primary task is to assist 
the state in comprehending that state’s national interests.65   
 Many regions in Russia have conformed to Putin’s ambition to organize civil 
society and have modeled their own Public Chambers after the Federal Chamber. In 2007 
four of the then seven federal districts contained local Public Chambers, and in 2009 they 
had formed in six districts.66 As of 2013 Public Chambers can be found in all eight 
federal districts, moreover the majority of the regions located in those eight districts have 
formed their own local chambers (see Figure 2.)  The figure that follows shows a map of 
the Russian Federation divided into its eight federal districts. Each districts’ regions are 
separated into those that contain local public chambers and those that do not. Of the 
eighty-three regions sixty-nine have local public chambers compared to the fourteen that 
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The Kremlin encouraged regional chambers to adhere to the federal model, the 
vision of state and society inherent in sovereign democracy, however there is no concrete 
evidence that suggests they were forced to do so. The Kremlin believed if the majority of 
regions choose to replicate the federal chamber the vertical power structure would be 
strengthened, as would the nation’s internal sovereignty. It would do this in two ways. 
First, it would create a detailed outline of the proper, Kremlin approved, role of public 
initiatives in Russian society. Secondly, the federal Public Chamber would dominate a 
statewide network of regional chambers insuring centralized control.67  
 
The Public Chamber: Defenders of Civil Society or Defenseless?  The Public Chamber 
symbolizes the sovereign democracy’s version of civil society, therefore it is not able to 
pass legislation or make binding decisions. The Kremlin recruited social organizations to 
aid the state in managing society more efficiently. Putin desired for these organization to 
“become good and genuinely indispensable partners for the state,” and assist in important 
social objectives such as “AIDS prevention, drug addiction, homeless children, the social 
rehabilitation of disabled people and developing local self-government.” 68  The 
Chamber’s principal objective is to analyze prevalent social issues and advise 
governmental actors on the most efficient means of public policy. Public Chamber 
members are forbidden to participate in any political parties or bring their personal 
political beliefs into Chamber discussion. They are supposed to act as a united coalition  
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that speaks as the voice of civil society.  However, many doubt the effectiveness of the 
Public Chamber, and believe it is an arena where a few elites use government resources 
for personal gain. 
From the Public Chamber’s conception, many have regarded it with apprehension and 
skepticism. Many critics claimed the chamber’s only reason for existing is to create the 
illusion of representation for civil society. Igor Yakovenko, leader of the Russian Union 
of Journalists, was quoted affirming the chamber served only as “the Kremlin’s puppet 
theater.”69 Nikolai Petrov viewed the chamber as a “thoroughly domesticated element of 
civil society in bureaucratic form,” and would serve as an alternate for the Duma, where 
demands for social reform could be voiced but without the legislative power to legalize 
them.70  Petrov also referred to the Public Chamber as a premiere example of “weakened 
institutions being replaced by substitutes with no independent legitimacy and which are 
controlled by the president.”71  These allegations may or may not be true, they frequently 
are not accompanied with any quantitative or qualitative support and often read as 
wishing for the chambers failure under assumptions of the Russian government’s 
indifference towards its citizens.  Little serious interests, both from academics and the 
public, have been directed towards the success of the Russian Public Chamber.  
 The Public Chamber not only faces the criticism of the outside elite but the 
challenge of an apathetic public. The average Russian citizen tends to be suspicious of  
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organized activity; a throwback to the Soviet era. Additionally, people still know very 
little about the Third Sector (NGOs) or the government bodies that work with them like 
the federal Public Chamber. Sarah Henderson reported that according to a 2009 VTsIOM 
poll, only 3 percent felt well informed about the Public Chamber, 37 percent had “heard 
something” and 57 percent did not even know it existed.72  
 The Federal Public Chamber was created to enact the ideals of state and society 
depicted in the Russian concept of sovereign democracy; nonetheless it seems to have 
failed in achieving this objective. Rather the chamber is often viewed as a collection of 
individuals using the state’s resources to further their own interests. 73  As stated 
previously, there has been little research conducted to efficiently judge the effectiveness 
of the Public Chamber.  The challenge seems to be getting the regional selection 
committees to nominate true civil activists and not those only concerned with promoting 
their personal agendas.74  Nevertheless, the Public Chamber is striving to produce an 
official record containing data on civil society through an annual “Status of Civil Society 
Report.” The annual report discuses new trends in the development of the nonprofit 
sector, and summarizes topical issues discussed by the citizens of Russia throughout that 
year. As well as gives data on the social and civic climate in Russian society and its level 
of cohesion and trust authorities.75 
 In summary the Public Chamber is a body that was created to appease the average  
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Russian citizens and allow them to voice their complaints in a Kremlin approved fashion, 
however the public remains indifferent to the organization. The only authority the 
chamber possesses is derived from Putin, and if his approval were ever lost the Public 
Chamber would crumble. After the Color Revolutions President Vladimir Putin saw a 
direct need for this type of elite coalition. The nongovernmental organization the Public 
Chamber of the Russian Federation served as a solution to that dilemma.  
  
 
The Russian Defense of  “The Last European Dictatorship”  
  
 In this final section we move from Russian domestic policies affected by the Color 
Revolutions to foreign policy. The Russian leadership feared more former Soviet States 
would experience a Color Revolution, especially Belarus. Belarus encompasses an 
essential position in Russia’s European security policy, and an absence of it would cause 
Russia’s sphere of influence to shift eastward.76 Traditionally countries that experience 
democratic change begin to align more with the West. For example, after the Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine the new president, Viktor Yushchenko, began pursuing 
membership in the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It 
is not a far stretch to assume a more democratic Belarus would become affiliated with the 
West. Therefore, the Kremlin has become adamant that a Color Revolution does not 
occur in Belarus.  What follows is a discussion of how the revolutions have influenced  
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Russian foreign policy decisions in relation to Belarus, using a case study of the Russian 
reaction to the 2006 presidential elections in Belarus. I look at the assistance the Kremlin 
gave President Alexsandr Lukashenko after the 2006 presidential elections.  
 
Russia Federation and Republic of Belarus: A Historically Symbiotic Relationship: 
July 20th, 2014 will mark Alexsandr Lukashenko’s 20th year as the first, and only, 
President of the independent Republic of Belarus. The new Republic’s slide into 
authoritarian begun in late 1996, two years after Lukashenko took office. Lukashenko 
instigated a constitutional crisis when he announced his intention to amend the 1994 
Constitution, which weakened the parliament and Constitutional Court, as well as 
extended his presidential term for two more years. There was an attempt to impeach 
Lukashenko, however, it was not until the Russian Prime Minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, 
got involved that the conflict was resolved.77 The vital role Russia played in Belarus’s 
1996 constitutional crisis exhibited the prominent role Russia holds in other country’s 
internal affairs.   
 Russia’s relationship with Belarus is the closest of any former Soviet Union 
Republics; furthermore, reintegration of the two countries was even proposed in the mid-
1990s. The proposed Russia-Belarus union’s grounding can be simplified in two reasons. 
First, Russia and Belarus share an historical origin, along with Ukraine, the two 
countries’ founding can be traced to the ancient civilization of Kievan Rus; this had led  
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many Russians to believe the union is naturalistic.78 Secondly, many scholars recognize 
that Belarus lacks a strong national identity; the Soviet Union’s russification program 
found the most success in Belarus. This has led to Belarus being the most pro-Russian of 
the former Republics, and established long history of mutual cooperation and assistance 
dominated by Russia. The close relationship between the two has been vital in insulating 
Belarus from Western influences and political reform. I argue both Putin and Lukashenko 
have benefited from the Russian-Belarus union because it has allowed them to isolate 
Belarus from the West. Lukashenko remained in control of Belarus, while Putin ensured 
a pro-Russian authoritarian ally remained in power. Belarus forms the eastern border with 
the democratic Western states; therefore the loss of the country to democracy would be 
tremendous. 
 It is in the best interest of authoritarian leaders to halt the effects of democratic 
diffusion by assisting similar regimes. After the 2003-2005 wave of democracy swept 
through the former Soviet Union, Russia’s hegemony in the region was threatened.  
Under the guise of the Russian form of democracy, sovereign democracy, Russian 
foreign policy became focused on securing its state sovereignty through means of 
preempting democracy. Vitali Silitski defines this as “Preemptive authoritarianism…. a 
strategy to combat the democratic contagion [and] is becoming commonplace in the 
political practices of nondemocratic governments throughout Eurasia.”79  This tactic is 
exemplified in Russian foreign policy, especially after the Color Revolutions, toward  
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Belarus. Suzanne Werner states, “Leaders fearful of such effects [democratic diffusion] 
have a keen interest in seeing the establishment or the maintenance of governments 
abroad that strengthen, or at least do not undermine, their position at home and a keen 
interest in undermining governments abroad that pose any threat to their position at 
home.”80  To Bolster the stability Lukashenko’s authoritarian regime has become the 
focal point of Russian foreign policy. This is seen in Russia’s reaction and foreign policy 
actions towards the 2006 presidential election in Belarus.  
 
The 2006 Belarusian Presidential Election: On March 19, 2006 Belarus held its third 
presidential election since the states independence, and with the exception of Russia, no 
other notable government or governmental organizations recognized the election as free 
and fair. The Belarusian Central Commission for Elections and National Referendums 
(CEC) released the official election results on March 23, 2006, which are summarized in 
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 The results stated 6,630,653 million out of a voting population of 7.1 million (93%) 
participated in the 2006 presidential election. Of those 6.63 million 5,501,249 (83%) 
voted for incumbent president Lukashenko, 405,486 (6.1%) for opposition candidate 
Alexsandr Milinkevich, 230,664 (3.5%) for Sergei Haidukevich and 147,402 (2.2%) for 
Alexsandr Kozulin.81 The results were obviously falsified.  All public opinion polls taken 
prior to the election had allotted Lukashenko more than 60%; others depicted a 
considerably lower percentage. Additionally, the numbers reported for the opposition 
candidates appeared ridiculously low considering their previous support.82 These clearly 
contrived results developed into a brief protest movement led by the opposition  
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candidates, calling for a repeat election.   
 On the night of the election an estimated 10,000 people gathered in Minsk’s main 
square. The opposition leaders Kozulin and Milinkevich led this demonstration and called 
for a new democratic election to be held on July 16, 2006. Authorities allowed the protest 
to continue for five days, however the police detained those who tried to leave or reenter 
the square. Police also prevented food, clothing and blankets from being brought to the 
protestors. On the morning of March 24th the authorities broke up the demonstration and 
arrested the remaining protestors.  An estimated 500 to 1,000 people were arrested in 
association with the demonstration, including the opposition leaders Kozulin and 
Milinkevich.83 The protest ended without a regime change or a repeat election, and 
Belarusian government withstood harsh international criticism and pressure with the 
assistance of its vital ally, the Russian Federation.  
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 Russian employed three main tactics to bolster Lukashenko’s authoritarian regime 
in Belarus: (1) creating a sense of international legitimacy,  (2) ‘fraternal’ economic 
assistance and (3) media control and Pro-Lukashenko propaganda. These tactics keep 
Belarus from being politically, economically and militarily isolated in Europe, as well as 
removing the Western world’s ability to put pressure on the Lukashenko regime.  
 The Kremlin repeatedly defended Lukashenko’s regime in the international arena, 
and attempted to legitimize the government. Belarus is the only CIS autocracy located 
within Europe, therefore is regularly criticized.  To combat this Russia repeatedly lobbied 
to change the criteria of election monitoring and downsize the ODIHR branch of the 
OSCE.84 Russia also employed efforts to counter-monitor elections by introducing a new 
branch of the CIS that deals with elections, and since has pushed for their presence at all 
elections. Sergei Lavrov, the Foreign Minister, criticized "lopsided rules…which the 
OSCE is trying to impose contrary to the proposals on developing commonly accepted 
election monitoring rules.” This is to avoid an  “OSCE monopoly” on the election-
monitoring process.85 The increase of CIS monitors gives the Belarusian government a 
sense of international legitimacy where there would be none. In addition to its attempts to 
legitimize the 2006 presidential election, the Russian state has also given Lukashenko’s 
authoritarian regime a great deal of financial support throughout the years.   
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 Lukashenko often referred to Belarusian economy as an “economic miracle,” 
however there is no mystery to this miracle. Over the last two decades Russia has given 
Belarus considerable economic assistance to help it maintain internal stability and resist 
Western pressures. Furthermore, without this economic support the country’s unreformed 
economy would not have survived. In addition to reversing all reforms made before he 
took office, Lukashenko instituted a neo-socialist model of state controlled economy.86 
For instance, Russia heavily subsidized energy exports and has cancelled a large portion 
of Belarus’ debt. This allowed the country to sustain its standard of living and reinforced 
Belarusian industry.87 From 2001–2008, Belarus’s GDP on average grew by 8.3 percent 
annually, more swiftly than Europe and Central Asia at 5.7 percent and CIS at 7.1 
percent.88 In 2006 Russia charged Belarus $46.68 per 1000 cubic meters of gas, less than 
a fifth of the European price. According to economist Leonid Zaiko energy subsidies 
from Russia totaled more than 7 billion USD, which would be 30 percent of Belarus’s 
GDP. 89  The Russian economic assistance bolstered the Lukashenko’s authoritarian 
regime as well as sent a message to the less compliant governments, such as Georgia and 
Ukraine.  
 In the year before the presidential election the Russian and Belarusian governments 
highlighted the stark contrast between Belarus gas prices and that of (democratic) 
Ukraine. This was a key strategy used to foster support for Lukashenko before the 2006  
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elections.  David Marples argues the price they paid for these low prices would be paid 
later in the form of Belarusian gas company Beltransgaz to the gargantuan Russian 
conglomerate Gazprom; however, this fact remained hidden from the public until after 
the elections.90 Russian aid has taken the place of foreign assistance, which has been 
withheld from Belarus due to its authoritarian policies. In addition to economic assistance 
given in 2006, Russia also went to great lengths to positively portray and support the 
Lukashenko regime.  
 The Kremlin has directly endeavored to increase support for Lukashenko by 
implementing pro-Lukashenko propaganda though the Russian controlled media and elite 
public shows of support. The 2006 presidential election was highly publicized by the 
Russian television, which is widely shown in other Russian speaking countries. These 
stations portrayed Lukashenko in an extremely positive light while criticizing the 
legitimacy of his opponents. Moreover, they condemned the Color Revolutions in 
Ukraine and Georgia, and later accused Western governments of an attempt to interfere 
with Belarus internal affairs.91   
 When U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice met with Belarusian opposition 
leaders in April 2005 she advocated they unite against the Lukashenko’s regime.   In 
response, Putin met with Lukashenko the very next day to publicize his support of the 
leader. Soon after Sergei Lavrov publicly announced, “We think the democratic process, 
the process of reform cannot be imposed from the outside,” and cautioned against  
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attempting a regime change, according to Western standards, in Belarus.92  A short time 
later, Sergei Ivanov, Russian defense minister, at the 42nd International Conference on 
Security Policy in February 2006 referred to Lukashenko as “the most popular politician 
in Belarus whether you like it or not,” and emphasized “We [the Russian Federation] 
treat negatively a flare-up of disorders after the elections and believe it is necessary to do 
[our] utmost to prevent them.”93 Ivanovo’s statement indicated the Kremlin would not 
tolerate a color revolution in Belarus.  
 The urgent threat of a Color Revolution in Belarus ended when the fleeting protests 
in March and April 2006 collapsed. However, the Russian support for maintaining an 
authoritarian regime in Belarus remains still to this day. The Russia-Belarus alliance 
offers Belarus a promising third alternative to its otherwise stark options. If not for 
Russian support then Belarus would either be forced to join the European Union, which 
would require drastic political and economic changes, most likely ousting Lukashenko. 
Or the country would face complete political, economic and military isolation. The third 
alternative Russia presents has allowed Belarus to ignore Western pressures and regional 
democratic trends. Russia continues to bolster authoritarianism in Belarus, because as 
Lukashenko himself said “a revolution in Belarus is a revolution in Russia.”94  
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The Color Revolutions that appeared throughout the former Soviet republics have 
profoundly disturbed the Putin administration. The Kremlin responded to these 
democratic revolutions by creating the term “sovereign democracy,” a uniquely Russian 
form of democracy. They claimed Western interference imposed Western style liberal 
democracy on the Russian population. Under the guise of promoting this Russian form of 
democracy the Putin administration has instituted a number of authoritarian domestic and 
international policies. Since the Color Revolutions Russian policy have became focused 
on securing state sovereignty through means of preempting democracy, and it has strived 
to insulate itself internally from a Color Revolution while simultaneously bolstering 
authoritarian regimes in neighboring countries.  
This essay examined how the newly created philosophy, sovereign democracy, 
has affected Russian domestic and foreign policies. Done through case studies of the 
Russian Public Chamber and Belarusian presidential elections of 2006; sovereign 
democracy was a concept designed to deflect criticism of the West, and as a way for the 
Russian Federation to expand its influences and retain its status as a major world power.  
Officially, Russia is a democratic state, however in reality, democratic practices 
have been substituted with authoritarian methods. I argued that sovereign democracy was 
a term created to justify the Russian Federation’s undemocratic policies to the 
international community. When the Kremlin proclaimed sovereign democracy as the 
uniquely Russian form of democracy, it constructed a defense against international  
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criticism; because, to question sovereign democracy, and the policies it spawned, would 
be tantamount to criticizing Russian social and cultural history. This research is more 
than just a reflection on the past with limited relevance. The policy justification sovereign 
democracy created was not limited the period immediately after the Color Revolutions. 
Russia continues to use the rationalization of sovereign democracy in present time, as 
seen in Putin and Russia’s reactions to the ongoing popular revolt in Ukraine. Their 
response falls into the same pattern.  
The memory of the successful 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine generated an 
aggressive response from the Russian government into current Ukrainian affairs. The 
Kremlin saw the popular revolt in Ukraine as foreshadowing to another possible 
democratic transition within the country. Since such a transition in 2004 led to Ukraine 
aligning more with the West as well as lessened Russian influence, Putin and his 
administration were not willing to risk the prospect of a repeat experience. This is one 
possible explanation for the increasingly aggressive Russian policy towards Ukraine and 
its decision to invade and annex the Crimean Peninsula, shaping Russia’s continuously 
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